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Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of  capital flight
in sub Saharan African countries (SSA) by introducing corruption
as a focus variable in the model. The econometric analysis is based
on data from 25 SSA countries over the period 1986–2010 using
dynamic panel data estimation methods: Corruption, our focus
variable retains its expected positive sign and is statistically significant
across all the estimations. The relationship remains very strong even
when other standard control variables are taken into account. These
results confirm our hypothesis that the nature of  corruption in
SSA is such that it encourages and promotes capital flight. The
empirical findings also indicate that the capital flight in SSA countries
is driven mainly by corruption, lag capital flight, external debt,
foreign direct investment, and macroeconomic uncertainty. Based
on these results, the paper recommends that governments in the
region should manage their external debt efficiently, and stabilize
their monetary and macroeconomic policies in order to curtail capital
flight. Finally, our results are also robust to different specifications,
measures of  corruption, and econometrics estimation techniques.
1. INTRODUCTION
Countries within sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are facing substantial and major financing
gaps, and thus hindering the much-needed public and private investments that will
make it likely for the region to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)2
adopted by member states of  the United Nations in September 2015 in New York.
Take for example, the first and second dimensions of  the goals: economic
development and social inclusion; achieving them by the year 2030 will be a mirage
if  conscious efforts are not made to block the gaps and black holes in the continent’s
public finances. This is coming against the backdrop of  member states in SSA starting
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from very low initial conditions: levels of  deprivation are acute; infrastructure is
inadequate and capital is in short supply. Achieving the SDGs will therefore be a
herculean task given that the region is also the source of  large-scale capital flight for
over the last 40 years. The scale of  the challenge is enormous and according to Kar
and Freitas (2012), developing countries on average, lost between US$ 586 billion to
US$919 billion annually to capital flight between the intervening periods of  2001 to
2010.
Capital flight, in terms of  level, is generally heterogeneous across the region;
however, what is very obvious from Figure 1 is that countries like Nigeria and Angola
that are known as oil-producing nations are topping the list in terms of  the amount
of  capital flight from SSA. The main concern, therefore, is that while the volume of
capital flight from Africa may be small relative to other regions of  the world, it
carries with it some substantially heavier costs for the African economies in terms
of  foregone economic development opportunities, and perhaps this is why the nature
of  capital flight from the region is particularly injurious. Other previous related
independent studies conducted for SSA countries have equally established the
existence of  capital flight as well as its effects on economic growth (as a precursor to
the findings of  Ndikumana et al. (2015), see other similar works by Morgan Guarantee
and Trust Company (1986); Lessard and Williamson (1987); Murindi, Hermes and
Lessink (1996); Ajayi (1997); Boyce and Ndikumana (2000), among others).
Given that sub Saharan African countries are lagging behind in major human
development indicators relative to other parts of  the world (see Tables 1), capital
flight according to Fofack and Ndikumana (2010), carries heavy opportunity cost as
it undermines the much-needed domestic investment, and according to Nkurunziza
(2015), it equally retards economic growth and undermines poverty reduction.
Empirical evidence on the ground in the region equally indicates that most of  the
flight capital from SSA countries ultimately hurts the poor and is usually a by-product
of  official corruption as established, for examples by the activities of  some African
leaders3. Even more recently in 2016 is what is now known as “Panama Papers”4
scandal. Despite this reality, few studies, if  any have attempted to systematically
incorporate corruption into the capital flight and economic growth analysis.
This study seeks to provide empirical evidence by shedding light on the role
that corruption plays as a determinant of  capital flight. Specifically, the paper aims
to address two empirical questions. First, is there a relationship between corruption
and capital flight within the region? On the one hand, it may be hypothesized that
corruption may provide resources that fuel capital flight, which would imply a positive
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relationship between the two phenomena; in other words, countries with high
corruption would also have high capital flight. This question is worth investigating
given that the level of  corruption and capital flight within the region is getting worse.
While the literature has established that external borrowing fuels capital flight (Boyce,
1992; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003, 2011a), relatively little attention has been paid
to the possibility that corruption may also be a determinant of  capital flight. The
paper is based on a sample of  25 SSA countries for which we have adequate data on
capital flight from 1986 to 2010. The analysis uses panel data econometric estimation
techniques to investigate the determinant of  capital flight by focusing on the role of
corruption. The econometric specification and estimation take into account the
persistence of  capital flight over time as documented in the literature (or hysteresis;
Ndikumana et al., 2015) and potential endogeneity of  regressors using the system
dynamic panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). The main results that emerge from this paper indicate that in the
context of  SSA countries macroeconomic instability poor institutional quality, debt
and corruption are used in part to finance capital flight. The results reveal also that
capital flight episodes arise in the presence of  less developed financial system.
The remainder of  the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a
definition and measurement of  capital flight. Section 3 provides a review of  the
literature, summarizing the evidence on the determinants of  capital flight. The
theoretical, empirical model and the estimation methodology are provided in Section
4. Section 5 describes the data and some economic intuition. Section 6 presents and
discusses the econometric results. Section 7 concludes
2. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
When it comes to defining capital flight there are several definitions in the literature,
one good example is given by Dooley (1986) who defines capital flight as outflows
that are held by non-resident, that is beyond the reach of  local monetary and fiscal
policies or do not yield an interest domestically. Similarly, it also refers to the movement
of  money from investment in one country to another in order to avoid country-
specific risks like hyperinflation, political instability and anticipated depreciation and
devaluation of  the local currency. The phenomena tend to point towards the notion
that: capital flight is said to occur when government officials and wealthy individuals
in society move financial assets out of  the country in desperation to avoid actual or
expected government intervention that could substantially reduce the value of  their
assets. It includes everything from carrying cash across the border in suitcases so as
258 Alloysius J Egbulonu and Keshab Bhattarai
to avoid an expected increase in taxes to lying about the number of  receipts gained
from exporting products and using the excess export earnings to buy a mansion in
Chelsea or Kensington, London, United Kingdom
Capital flight as a phenomenon is unobservable and therefore has to be estimated.
Measuring capital flight is not straight forward and can be quite difficult, and this is
partly because of  the existing lack of  consensus in having a precise definition of  the
concept. As a result, the measurement of  capital flight is usually driven by the
definition adopted per time. However, the literature on capital flight has identified
several measures. The nature of  capital flight is likely to affect its estimations but
definitely not its economic consequences. Generally, the following measures of  capital
flight can be found in the literature: Dooley Method; Residual Method; Hot Money
Method; Trade Mis-invoicing Method and Asset Method.
The Dooley Method: This method tends to define capital flight as all legal and
illegal capital outflows that are driven by the singular desire to place assets or wealth
beyond the reach and control of  domestic authorities. This method of  computing
capital flight takes the total number of  capital outflows as reported in the balance of
payments statistics and then makes some modifications by accounting for errors
and omissions. It also factors in the difference in the change in the stock of  external
debts and external borrowing, and if  the stock of  external debt is larger than external
borrowing the difference is assumed to be part of  capital flight. Furthermore, by
using a representative market interest rate and in this case, the United States of
America deposit rate, the stock of  external assets is computed in such a way to align
with the reported interest rate earnings in the balance of  payment. Finally, capital
flight is measured as the difference between total capital outflows and the change in
the stock of  external assets matching reported interest income.
Capital flight according to the Dooley method can be computed as:
TCO = FB + FI – CAD – �FRS – NEO – �WBIMF (1)
Where TCO denotes total capital outflows, FB denotes foreign borrowing as
reported in the balance of  payment statistics. FI is the net foreign investment
flows, CAD while is the current account deficit, and FRS is the foreign exchange
reserve. NEO is net errors and omissions and WBIMF represents the difference
between the change in the stock of  external debt reported by the World Bank and
foreign borrowing reported in the balance of  payments statistics published by the
IMF.
The stock of  external assets (SEA) is calculated as:
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Where r
w
 denotes international market interest rate and RR
t
 is the registered
receipt. Capital flight from the Dooley method is then measured as:
CF
d
 = TCO + SEA (3)
The Residual Method: This is the most used method in the literature and is
otherwise known as the World Bank method. It is fairly straightforward in the way it
is computed. In addition to comparing the sources and uses of  capital flows, it also
considers all private capital outflows as capital flight. It also acknowledges the
challenges of  separating normal and abnormal capital outflows, and as a result, it
measures all unrecorded outflows as capital flight. In addition to foreign reserves
FRS as uses, the current account deficits (CAD) on one hand is compared with both
the net increases in external debt (ED) and the net inflow of  foreign investment
(FI). When the sources are more than the uses of  capital inflows, the difference is
then referred to as capital flight. From the foregoing, the residual method of  capital
flight can be presented in an equation format as follow:
CF
r
 = �ED + FI – CAD – �FR (4)
where � denotes change and CF represents capital flight
It is worth pointing out that the residual method has been widely used in the
literature and in some cases with minor variations to the above formula. Some studies
that have implemented the above standard approach are: Erbe (1985) and the World
Bank (1985), while a modified version of  the residual method was implemented by
Morgan Guaranty Trust (1985) and Murinde et al. (1996) by including the change in
the foreign assets of the local baking system.
The Hot Money Method: This measure takes the view that capital flight is
measured by adding up non-bank private short-term capital outflows together with
net errors and omissions. This is akin to a situation the capital outflows are responding
to short term differences in the various market conditions (domestic and
international). Examples of  authors that have used this method to measure
capital flight are: Cuddington (1986) and Gibson and Tsakalotos (1993). The hot




 = SCO + NEO (5)
where CF denotes hot money capital flight and SCO is the total amount of  short-
term capital flows.
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The Trade Mis-invoicing Method: In this method, capital flight is derived by
comparing data from both the exporting and importing countries. Capital flight
happens when importers report higher values of  imported goods when contrasted
with the values of  the same reported exported goods. Some of  the authors that have
used trade mis-invoicing measure of  capital flight are Claessens and Naude (1993).
On the other hand, exporters are said to be engaged in capital flight when they
report lower values of  goods exported when compared with the same values of
reported goods by importers. Export under-invoicing and export over-invoicing are
the mechanisms under which capital flight occur through residents including resident’s
abnormal capital outflows. In other words, both the malpractices of  export under-
invoicing and import over-invoicing are the financial vehicle through which
domestically accumulated wealth is siphoned outside the country. However, this
method of  measuring capital flight is highly contested and deemed inaccurate because
of  the poor quality of  import and export data occurring as a result of  trade mis-
Figure 1: Capital Flight from SSA (1970-2010) (billion, constant 2010US$)
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invoicing. Critique of  this measure, amongst others, include: Lessard and Williamson
(1987); Ajayi (1997); Collier et al. (2001) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2002) proposed
that adjustments of  the capital flight figures by using the residual method will correct
for the abnormality.
The Asset Method: This method of  measuring capital flight represents a direct
and short cut approach. Authors like Hermes and Lensink (1992); and Collier et al.
(2001) measure capital flight way by taking the total stock of  assets of  non-bank
residents held by a foreign bank which is readily available from the IMF’s IFS. Put
differently, it measures the minimum amount of  assets held abroad. In addition to a
bank account, residents can also hold their assets in other forms. For example, assets
can be held via foreign equity holdings. The drawback for this method according to
Ajayi (1997) is that it fails to recognise the fact that huge amount of  assets not
related to bank deposits are equally held abroad and even the so-called bank deposits
can also be held in financial jurisdictions with banking secrecy enshrined in their
statutes books and thereby making it difficult to identify the names and nationalities
of  the depositors.
Figure 1: Showing mean Real Capital Flight (% of  GDP) from SSA countries
using the Boyce and Ndikumana (2010) Dataset. On the x-axis is capital flight, and
on the y-axis are the countries. From this figure, one can see a trend for concern in
terms of  the volume of  capital flight from most countries in our sample. The
descending order hbar shows that about 84 per cent of  countries from the sample
are faced with problems of  capital flight.
Table 1: Table showing Capital flight from Africa, 1970-2010 (billion, constant 2010US$)
Period FDI ODA Capital Flight
1970-1979 29.8 128.0 225.2
1980-1989 39.1 182.8 307.4
1990-1999 73.9 246.5 230.3
2000-2010 316.3 317.5 510.9
Total 459.1 874.8 1273.8
Data is sourced from www.peri.umass.edu and computed by the author
3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature on the determinant of  capital flight is vast in relation to developing
countries. Starting with a more recent paper on the study of  capital flight in Africa,
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Ndikumana et al. (2015) examined 39 countries in Africa covering 1970 to 2010
period and came to the conclusion that capital flight from the region peaked at
US$1.3 trillion in constant terms. This estimate in 2010 represents eighty-two per
cent of  the GDP of  all the countries considered in the study. The authors came to
the conclusion that: “If  this capital was invested abroad and earned interest at the
going market rates, the accumulated capital loss for these countries over the thirty-
nine-year period was US$944 billion”. Putting the scale of  the loss into perspective,
for the year 2008, the total GDP of  all countries within SSA was estimated to be
US$997 billion. Taking a global view on the volume of  capital flight across the other
developing regions (Asia and Latin America) of  the world, African region does not
top the list in real US$ terms but it remains the biggest when compared to the size
of  the economies of  countries within SSA. It is also important to emphasise that
capital flight as a problem is not only unique to sub-Saharan African countries or
other developing countries in particular, it is a global challenge to both developed
and developing countries in general. As a matter of  fact, recent academic work by
Zucman (2013), show that less developed countries account for a small share of
global unrecorded financial flow or capital flight.
Figure 2 :Showing Mean Corruption Perception Index for SSA Countries
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Earlier studies empirically give credence to the hypothesis that capital flight is
higher when a country’s rate of  economic growth is low. Pastor (1990), for example,
in a study of  the USA and Latin American countries finds that the growth rate
potential between the two regions is an important determinant of  capital flight.
Similarly, Nyoni (2000) relates capital flight from Tanzania to the growth rate
differential between the United Kingdom and obtains a similar result.
In a study investigating the impact of  capital flight on economic growth over
the period of  2002-2006 for a large number of  139 countries in the world, Gusarova
(2006) employed fixed effects panel regression and the result showed that capital
flight has a negative effect on economic growth but its significance was ambiguous
because the results were not robust to specifications that accounted for region or
year effects. In the same vein, Cervena (2006) in a recent study investigated the
impact of  capital flight on long term economic growth for a cross-section of  75
developing countries by performing a pooled cross-section analysis based on fixed-
effects models. The Solow growth model is employed while controlling for other
important right-hand side variables. The results suggest that countries with a higher
capital flight to GDP ratio have experienced slower growth of  GDP per capita, and
with poorer countries suffering severe consequences. Similarly, Lan (2009) studied
the effects of  capital flight on economic growth in a sample of  selected Association
of  South-East Asian Nations(ASEAN) countries by employing the ARDL Bounds
test approach to co-integration with annual time series data spanning 1972-2005,
after employing 3 different measures of  capital flight the author concluded that on
the one hand that capital flight is positively related to higher external debts, higher
political instability and as well as higher budget deficit. On the other hand, the author
found a significant negative effect of  capital flight on growth in the respective
countries in the sample. In a related study, albeit for a different region, Ndiaye (2009)
examines the effect of  capital flight on economic growth in the Franc Zone (FZ)
area from 1970-2010. Three alternative measures of  capital flight were also employed
in the dynamic panel econometrics analysis used in the study and find that real
capital flight from countries in this zone in sub-Saharan Africa significantly reduces
economic growth. The results also confirm that domestic investment, credit to the
private sector, domestic savings and the quality of  institutions all play an important
role in explaining the influence of  capital flight on economic growth.
Olawale and Ifedayo (2015) in a study of  Nigeria, investigates the impacts of
capital flight on economic growth between the period of  1980 and 2012 using time
series error correction model as their main estimation technique and concluded
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that, overall, capital flight had a negative impact on the economy. In a more recent
paper, Ajayi (2014) takes a more-broader approach to the analysis and implications
of  capital flight for economic growth and development in Africa. The paper was
mainly descriptive and argues that capital flight undermines economic growth because
of  the resource gap which it exacerbates. This occurs through the ways in which
capital flight undermines domestic resource mobilization effort, reduces domestic
investment, reduces the tax base and ultimately leads to reduced public investment.
3.1. Determinants of  Capital Flight
Based on the determinants of  capital flight explored in the literature, six broad
categories have been found as consistent determinants of  capital flight:
Past Capital Flight: All else being equal, past capital flight have a tendency to
persist over time. In other words, past capital causes more capital and connotes a
positive relationship with real capital flight. These characteristics are attributed to
the concept of  habit formation and hysteresis. Past studies confirming this behaviour
are; Ndiaye (2009) in a study of  Franco Zone area of  Africa found that past capital
flight to have a positive effect on current capital flight. Boyce and Ndikumana (2003)
saw this as a habit formation effect in that as more private players gain more experience
moving capital abroad, they also get better at doing it over and over again. Cerra et al.
(2006) in a related study on capital flight and economic growth also found similar
result of  a positive influence of  past capital flight on current capital flight.
Contrary to the above results, Nyoni (2000) in a capital flight study of  Tanzania
found that past capital flight has a negative effect on current capital flight. Boyce
(1992) in a similar study of  capital flight in the Philippines found an insignificant
effect of  past capital flight on current capital flight. Even though these findings are
quite contradictory, and the effect far from conclusive, they could have been
influenced by the measure of  capital flight used, the sample or region studied and
the time period. By and large, most of  the literature points towards a positive effect.
Rate of  return differentials: This is proxied by the difference between an
African country’s interest rate and the more stable U.S interest rate (US real interest
rates minus the African country’s real interest rate). This variable has been used in a
lot of  studies to measure the relative attractiveness of  domestic assets to residents’
relative to foreign assets. This is the variable that encourages us to test the portfolio
choice theory hypothesis that capital flight is driven by mainly higher world interest
rates relative to domestic interest rates. On the whole, interest rate differentials do
not always have a statistically significant relationship with capital flight (Lensink et al.
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(1998). This may be an indication that perhaps other determinants like political
instability and macroeconomic instability are much better at explaining capital flight.
As for the countries in our sample, the motive for capital flight would probably also
be driven by the need to hide ill-gotten wealth from the reach of  tax authorities in
case the prevailing political realities changes.
Macroeconomic Instability: Countries experiencing macroeconomic instability
tend to manifest in different ways and can take the following form: Increase in the
budget deficit, growing inflation, exchange rate overvaluation, increase in current
account deficits, and general government debt. Also, put differently, macroeconomic
instability happens when there is an aggregate mismatch between domestic demand
and supply.
Exchange rate overvaluation has been consistently found to be a natural factor
in the determinants of  capital flight in the literature. If  a country’s currency is
overvalued through the exchange rate mechanism today, the natural expectation is
that devaluation of  the same currency will occur in the future and as a result, this
scenario will lead to loss of  real income as prices of  foreign goods rise relative to
domestic goods. To avoid losing out badly, most residents will hold part of  their
wealth abroad.
High inflation also reduces the real value of  the domestic assets and thereby
acting as an incentive for residents to hold their assets abroad. This variable has a
positive effect on capital flight and has been confirmed by several studies on the
determinants of  capital flight. Dooley (1988) confirmed the positive effect of  inflation
on capital flight and on the other hand, Boyce and Ndikumana (2003) in a study of
capital flight on developing countries found an insignificant effect of  inflation on
capital flight. The evidence for this variable is far from conclusive, however, economic
intuition and literature suggests that inflation drives capital flight positively. High
current account deficits and government budget deficits can also positively affect
capital flight and this is because it raises expectation on the part of  residents that
government will raise taxes in the future so as to help balance its public finances by
paying its debt.
Finally, it must be noted that evidence from the above macroeconomic indicators,
shows that macroeconomic instability will generally increase the incentives for capital
flight (see Lensink1 et al. (1998).
Political Instability: This variable is expected to encourage capital flight because
it increases the risks and uncertainty surrounding the policy environment and its
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outcomes for investors and domestic asset holders. For example, as a result of  the
perceived high level of  corruption and lack of  confidence in the domestic political
environment, residents would well prefer to hold their wealth abroad when they
contemplate the consequences of  these factors for the future value of  their assets.
Researchers that have found positive relationships between capital flight and political
instability are: Boyce and Ndikumana (2003) found a positive relationship between
capital flight and political risk and Collier et al. (2004) found a similar result.
Capital Inflows: Capital inflows generally tend to have positive effects on capital
flight. Examples of  capital inflows are long term debt, foreign direct investment, aid
and remittances. Foreign direct investment, according to Cuddington (1987), may
have a positive effect on capital flight because of  the inflows of  foreign currencies.
However, Lensink et al. (2000) in a study of  84 developing countries found a
contradictory result of  an insignificant effect on foreign direct investment. However,
Ajayi (1995) have argued that capital inflows such as aid and foreign direct investment
to developing countries are a strong contributory factor to capital flight because of
the simultaneous occurrence of  capital inflows and capital outflows.
External Debt: For so many developing countries, an increase in external debts
leads to inflationary financing and will ultimately result in an inflationary tax on the
residents in the future. Many empirical studies in the literature have confirmed that
there is a positive relationship between capital flight and external debt. What this
means is that higher external debt is associated with a higher capital flight. For
example, Boyce and Ndikumana (2003) in a study of  30 sub-Saharan African countries
over the 1970-1996 period, found that on average, 80 cents out of  every one U.S
dollar borrowed in a given year by a sub-Saharan African country left the region as
capital flight. Similarly, Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001) in a study of  capital flight in
India found a two-way relationship between capital flight and external debt and
concluded that the relationship is conformity with the revolving door hypothesis. A
financial revolving door hypothesis is where both external debt and capital flight
fuel each other by providing capital for reverse flow.
4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Several relevant theses have been advanced by past literature as rationale for capital
flight, however, in this chapter, we follow Le and Zak (2006) and employ a model of
“portfolio choice framework of  asset allocation” first used by Sheets (1995), and
subsequently by Collier et al. (2001) and Ali and Walters (2011) to help us explain the
role of  corruption in the capital flight process in SSA countries. Sheets (1995) using
Determinants of Capital Flight: New Panel Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 267
a portfolio-choice framework of  asset allocation, presents a theoretical model in
which capital flight is determined by risk diversification motive with one important
incentive like the rate of  return differential on investments and relative risk incentive.
The incentive, in this case, relates to factors that adversely impact the macroeconomic
environment, and as a result, reduce the risk-adjusted returns to domestic investments.
There are other incentives that also implies that capital flight arises due to factors
that raise the relative riskiness of  the domestic economy. Simplifying this further,
households can hold wealth (C) portfolios in the form of  both domestic and foreign
assets (i.e. in a different jurisdiction). The proportion of  the portfolio held abroad is
usually dependent on the returns and riskiness of  domestic assets relative to foreign
assets. In other words, capital flight would be driven by the difference between the
rate of  return to investment abroad and in the domestic market. Given that private
wealth holders are concerned about the real returns on their investments, the rate of
return differential between foreign and domestic asset is considered an important
determinant of  portfolio decisions. The relative return to investment is captured by
the interest rate differential with the expected coefficient being positive since higher
real interest rate differential encourages economic agents from SSA to hold their
wealth in foreign assets. The higher the differential, the higher the proportion of
portfolio held abroad.
We incorporate the important fact, as documented in the literature, that capital
flight tends to persist over time so that countries with high capital flight in the past
and present tend to have high capital flight in the future (Ndikumana and Boyce,
2003, 2011b; Ndikumana et al., 2015). This suggests modelling capital flight as dynamic
process where current capital flight depends on its lags. The specification of  the
empirical model is motivated by the goal of  this study which is to examine the
relationship between corruption and capital flight, for this purpose, we include
corruption as explanatory factors of  capital flight. The empirical capital flight equation

























 stands for Capital Flight as a percentage of  GDP.
riskit vector contains distortionary policy indicators.
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it
 is a measure that captures the rate of  return differentials.
Y
it
 denotes control for the overal level of  economic development (GDP per capita).
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�
t
 is a vector of  common time varying effects
µ
i
 captures unobserved time – invariant country specific effects; and
�
it
 is the time varying error term
The capital flight equation specified above is estimated using the Arellano-Bover/
Blundell-Bond linear panel-data method (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and
Bond, 1998), referred to as “systems dynamic panel data estimator”. It is an extension
of the original GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), enabling us to address
potential bias to the results in case of  serial correlation in the endogenous variable.
This approach is particularly appropriate given the persistent nature of  capital flight
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; Ndikumana et al., 2015), which is accommodated by
inclusion of  the lag(s) of  the dependent variable. This approach also enables us to
handle potential endogeneity of  explanatory variables.
5. DATA AND ECONOMIC INTUITION
Dependent Variable
We use capital flight as our dependent variable and it is expressed as a percentage of
GDP. There are different measures of  capital flight known to have been used in past
studies: it ranges from the World Bank method, developed in 1985; Morgan Guaranty
Trust method, developed in 1986, and the Cline method, developed in 1987. We use
the capital flight measures from the Political Economy Research Institute at the
University of  Massachusetts5, compiled by Ndikumana and Boyce. This estimate
suits our purpose because they were created for African countries and also in order
to minimize potential biases in narrower measures. Secondly, we also employed the
hot money estimates of  capital flight from the Global Financial Integrity Group as
a robustness check. The 6Global Financial Integrity data are estimates for three
different measures of  capital flight: Hot Money Method, Trade Mis-invoicing and
the World Bank Methods.
Corruption: Our main variable of  interest, which is corruption is very hard to
measure. This is partly because corrupt activities are quite opaque by nature. Some
authors focusing on the individual country study have used court cases or the numbers
of  actual prosecutions in a region or country as proxies for corruption. However,
we do not use this type of  data as a measure of  corruption mainly because it will not
be ideal for empirical cross-country studies like this and besides, such data may only
be an indication of  how good or bad the judicial system is and is nothing to do with
corruption. Like other recent researchers, we use the ICRG measure of  corruption
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that is perception-based and also subjective. However, the reason for using it is
motivated by the fact that its coverages include more countries and longer time
period across the globe. To that extent, it is therefore suited for cross country studies.
As mentioned earlier, corruption is only one aspect of  poor governance. To
help us test a broader measure of  governance, we also employ the Polity2 variable,
which is part of  the Polity IV Project, as an additional control variable or regressor.
In terms of  scores, a score of  -10(strongly autocratic) and a score +10(strongly
democratic).
Other Control Variables
As common in the economic literature, high variations in variables like real interest
rates (INT), real exchange rates (EXR), and inflation rates (INF) are clear indications
of  economic risk. This view is supported by the work of  De Gregoria (1993) who
maintain that macroeconomic and monetary uncertainty is usually indicated by high
variance in real interest rates and inflation rates. Therefore, we expect the signs of
the above variables to be positive in our regression analysis. Furthermore, Adji et al.
(1997) also find that the return on investment is grossly reduced when the exchange
rate appreciates. Therefore, as a key indicator of  market distortions, the variance of
the exchange rates variable is hypothesized to have a positive association with capital
flight.
GDP Per Capita: This variable was extracted from the World Bank Development
Indicators of  the World Bank. Higher GDP per capita represents a sign of  economic
progress and development. It also indicates a high return on domestic investment.
Therefore, this variable ought to reduce capital flight as private investors will now
be more interested in investing in the domestic market as a result of  the expected
higher return on investment. A negative sign is expected between capital flight and
higher economic growth (Ndikumana and Boyce 2008).
Inflation: This is measured as a percentage change in the consumer price index
and it is one of  the most important macroeconomic variables that influence capital
flight. The data is constructed from the World Development Indicators. A positive
relationship is expected between capital flight and inflation, and this is so because
high expected inflation would consequently lead to a high reduction in the values of
domestic assets when compared to assets held abroad.
Interest Rate Differentials: This is defined and estimated as the US risk-free
interest rate minus the domestic interest. This is proxied by the difference in the
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domestic country’s interest rate and U.S. interest rate. This variable is taken from the
World Development Indicator (2015) and computed by the author. This would help
test the conventional portfolio choice theory assumption that implies that capital
flight is driven by higher world interest rates relative to domestic interest rates. A
positive relationship is expected between interest rate differentials and capital flight
Polity 2: This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with capital flight.
However, the relationship can be both ways as political stability, on one hand, reduces
capital flight and on the other hand, political instability increases capital flight.
Debt: This is total debt and is taken from the World Development Indicators. It
is expected to have a positive relationship with capital flight. Empirical research
work by Ndikumana and Boyce (2011) shows that increased foreign borrowing is
positively related to capital flight. This can also increase the likelihood of  debt crises
and thereby worsening the country(s) macroeconomic conditions and investment
environment.
Past Capital Flight: This is also sourced from the Boyce and Ndikumana dataset
on capital flight (2011). The expected relationship with capital flight is positive.
Many empirical studies have reported positive results between past capital flight and
real capital flight (Murinde, 2014; Vos 1992), and it tends to persist over time and
thereby suggestive of  habit formation as private actors gain more experience in
capital flight operations.
FDI: This is also known as Foreign Direct Investment and it is included in the
study to find out how, and if  at all FDI have any effect on capital flight.
Table 2: Variables’ a Priori Expectations
Independent Variables Expected Signs with Capital Flight
Past Capital Flight Positive (+)
GDP Per Capita Negative (-)
Corruption Positive (+)




Interest Rate Differential Positive (+)
Real Exchange Rate Positive (+)
Bank credit to Private Sector Negative (-)
Budget Deficit Positive (+)
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents the results of  the empirical analysis on the determinants of
capital flight in 25 sub-Saharan African countries based on pooled OLS, Random
Effects and GMM models over 1986 to 2010 period. Tables 4. to 5. contain the
results of  the three models.
Initially, we estimated all the equations with pooled OLS and then implemented
two types of  estimator controlling for country-specific effects : (a) fixed effects
estimator takes into account that there may be omitted individual country effects
that are possibly correlated with the factors explicitly included in the equation and
treats these omitted factors as constant; and (b) the random effects estimator, it
assumes that any potentially omitted country-specific factors are uncorrelated with
those included in the model. We then implemented the Hausman test to choose
between the two estimators. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients obtained
from the efficient random effects estimator are not different from the ones estimated
by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If  they are (insignificant p-value, prob>chi2
larger than 0.05), then it is safe to use the random effects. From the test results, we
confirm the appropriateness of  the random effects model for all the equations across
our sample of  countries.
Table 4 presents our preliminary results from both pooled OLS and Random
Effects after controlling for the level of  economic development (GDP per capita)
and other macroeconomic instability (log of  inflation and exchange rate
overvaluation) and rate of  returns differentials that aided us in testing the portfolio
choice hypothesis. In all the specifications in pooled OLS and Random Effects results,
the coefficients of  GDP per capita have the right negative sign and it is highly
statistically significant at the 1% level in the 2 final results of  pooled OLS and Random
Effect. Implying that the higher the level of  economic development in countries
within our sample in SSA, the less the incentives for capital flight to occur. This
result is in line with economic intuition and much of  the literature. It supports the
empirical evidence provided by Beja (2006), who found that countries unable to
improve economic growth because of  weak macroeconomic policies or inefficient
economic sectors will discourage investors and can ultimately lead to conditions
conducive for capital flight. Turning to our debt variable, the coefficient shows the
expected positive sign in all the regressions but only strongly statistically positive in
last 2 full sample results for both pooled OLS and Random Effect. This result indicates
that increased total debt either through external borrowing or otherwise provide the
fuel and motive for capital flight In SSA countries. It may also reflect the relative
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riskiness of  the economies of  the sub-Saharan African countries in our sample.
This result is similar to Collier et al. (2001) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2008), who
found that higher levels of  indebtedness are linked to increased capital flight.
The result for the real exchange overvaluation variable as expected from the
literature, have the right positive sign but it is not statistically significant even at the
10% level in all the regressions. Generally, a positive and statistically significant result
of  an overvaluation of  a country’s exchange rate can lead to capital flight. This is
because when a nation’s currency is overvalued, there is a certain expectation that
the currency will depreciate in the future, and this induces the private investors or
savers to shift their portfolio compositions in favour of  foreign assets. Empirical
examples from previous studies are in Ngeno (2000), Ajayi (1992). On the other
hand, the interest rate return differential (This is the return differentials between
each country’s interest rate and the stable U.S. interest rate), coefficient is positive
and strongly statistically significant at the 1% level for both regressions in OLS and
Random Effect. This result concurs with Sheets (1995) and Ajayi (1992), who both
found that return differential can act as an incentive for capital flight when the
return on domestic instruments is low relative to the world’s, then foreign assets can
become highly attractive options for domestic economic agents.
The result for net foreign direct investment (FDI) represents a motive for capital
flight for both pooled OLS and Random Effect results, and this is because the
coefficient on FDI is positive and significant at the 1% level across all the regressions.
Implicitly, this connotes that some of  the dollars associated with FDI inflow to SSA
countries may likely end up as capital flight. The result suggests that governments
should pay more attention to FDI and ensure that FDI benefits their economies.
These results are consistent with the results of  Chunhachinda and Sirodum (2003).
For our main variable of  interest, corruption, in all the specifications in
pooled OLS and Random Effects results, the coefficient has the right positive sign
but it is not statistically significant even at the conventional level. This could well be
because of  the nature of  the estimator at this stage. Pooled OLS and Random Effect
are not known to be the best estimation methods because of  their limitation and
tendency to bias results (especially pooled OLS). A priori expectation is a positive
and statistically significant coefficient and therefore mean that the higher the level
of  corruption the higher the incentives for capital flight to occur.
Consistent with other empirical studies (Ajayi (1992)), Boyce and Ndikumana
(2003) and Lawanson (2007), the budget deficit variable has a positive sign in both
RE and OLS, however, it is statistically significant in RE at the 10% level but not in
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OLS. The positive sign suggests that a large government deficit may prompt capital
flight. This highlights the motivation of  investors to move capital abroad to escape
future taxation directly and indirectly via monetisation of  deficits. The result also
implies that fiscal mismanagement, and the need for future fiscal adjustment either
through formal taxation or inflationary financing clearly reflects the risks associated
with domestic policy environment.
Another important institutional variable is polity2 and the coefficient is negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level of  significance at both pooled OLS and
RE models. This result is consistent with the expected sign and this implies that in
the context of  governance and institution, emphasis on good governance and strong
institution within SSA countries will lead to a fall in capital flight. On the other
hand, if  less emphasis is put into building good governance and strong institution,
capital flight will likely persist.
The results for our measure of  financial development, which is proxied by the
ratio of  bank credit to the private sector is positive in both pooled OLS and RE and
statistically significant at the 1% level of  significance. This result indicates a positive
impact of  financial development on capital flight and therefore supports the
presumption that the development of  the financial system, and the ease of  conducting
a transaction that accompanies it, may facilitate the export of  capital.
Table 5. reports the results of  our system GMM estimation, and with respect to
our main variable of  interest, the coefficient of  the corruption variable is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of  significance for both system
GMM and difference GMM respectively. This implies that corruption is positively
associated with capital flight from sub-Saharan African countries in our study. In
practice, this means that corruption is an important factor affecting capital flight
from these countries. Put differently, it leads to a higher level of  capital flight because
of  the way corruption affects it. This is not entirely surprising, given that in an
environment of  poor governance and weak accountability, the private economic
agent cannot fully internalize the costs of  corruption and may choose to hedge
against uncertainty by holding assets abroad. This result is consistent with an earlier
empirical work of  Le and Rishi (2006) who reported a positive effect of  corruption
on capital flight for a study of  69 countries involving both developed and developing
countries.
Looking at the other institutional variable of  polity2, the results confirm our
earlier finding in our pooled OLS and RE of  the negative and statistically significant
effect of  governance and political stability on capital flight. This result which showed
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that polity2 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level implies that poor
political stability proxied by the polity2 variable is associated with higher capital
flight. Conversely, positive political stability will lead to less capital flight from our
sample of  countries.
With respect to the other control variables, the FDI variable is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level in all the regressions. This result implies that
FDI is associated with higher outflow of  capital flight from sub-Saharan African
countries. The reason for this result and interpretation could be because of  the
nature of  most FDI to sub-Saharan African, which most often than not is mostly
connected to natural resources exploitation with little or no forward and backward
linkages with the wider economy. The result for our main measure of  economic
development (per capita GDP) reports a strongly negative and statistically significant
effect at the 1% level of  significance. These results imply that economic growth is
an important factor to explain capital flight from SSA member countries. Although
in the literature, capital flight may directly undermine economic growth via several
channels (see Erbe (1985), Cuddington (1987), Ajayi (1997)), Williamson (1987) and
Dooley et al. (1994). This outflow of  capital can be activated by both private sectors
and government officials. Since investment return is higher in advanced countries,
private sectors are interested to invest their additional money in the advanced economy.
On the other hand, a corrupt government official may also embezzle public money
through money laundering. These results confirm the findings of  Murinde, Hermes
and Lesink (1996).
Economic growth: As expected, the coefficient of  GDP per capita variable
has a negative sign, which is statistically significant. This result concurs with the
findings of  Ajayi (1992) and contradicts the findings of  Ngeno (2000), who found
the coefficient to be positive and significant. This empirical finding provides some
support for the hypothesis that capital flight is higher when a country’s rate of
economic growth is low. This implies that low economic growth is an indication
of  low profitability of  domestic investment, and therefore capital will tend to flee
the country.
The coefficient on the inflation rate variable has a positive sign and this is in
conformity with the theoretical expectation. The coefficient is also statistically
significant and this result concurs with the findings of  Pastor (1990), Olopoenia
(2000) and Okit (2000). The result suggests that capital flight over the period may
have resulted from the high and rising inflation rates in the country that led to
erosion of  the real values of  assets denominated in domestic currency terms. This
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may have forced individuals to reduce real holding of  the domestic currency in
order to protect themselves against inflation tax. Part of  their assets holdings is
directed to domestic real assets, while the other part finds its way to real investment
or deposit abroad. Therefore, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that high
inflation makes assets denominated in domestic currency less attractive compared
to those denominated in foreign currency.
Inflation is positively and significantly related to capital flight in the full
sample. The results suggest that high inflation erodes the real value of  domestic
assets, which induces residents to hold assets outside the continent. High inflation
may also signal future exchange rate depreciation, which also increases capital
flight.
Debts: The results confirm that increased total debt either through external
borrowing or otherwise, provides the fuel and motive for capital flight as the
coefficient on debt is positive and significant at the 1% level. In all models, the
estimated coefficients of  total debt are from approximately 95 to 98 per cent, this
means that the majority of a dollar of total debt in SSA countries will end up as
capital flight. The results also suggest that governments within the region are
responsible for ensuring that borrowings benefit their economies and not for the
funds end up enriching few individuals. This finding is in line with Boyce and
Ndikumana (2002) for sub-Saharan African countries and Beja (2007) for Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand.
As theoretically expected, the coefficient on the debt variable has a positive sign
and which is statistically significant. The result concurs with the findings of  Boyce
and Ndikumana (2002). This empirical finding implies that the growing foreign
debts in the country may increase expectations about exchange rate depreciation
and an increase in taxation, which provides a stimulus to hold foreign assets. Finally,
we find a consistently positive and significant impact of  total debt, suggesting that
increased borrowing may fuel capital flight. This finding is consistent with the
literature (Ndikumana and Boyce (2003, 2011)).
Interest Rate Differentials
The coefficient of  interest rate differential variable has a positive sign and it is
statistically significant. This result concurs with the findings of  Ngeno (2000) and
Ajayi (1992) that found the coefficient to be positive and statistically significant. The
positive sign implies that if  financial markets are liberalised, and international capital
movement is deregulated then domestic capital may be expected to flow abroad as
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long as risk-adjusted returns are higher elsewhere. On the other hand, a negative and
statistically significant result will have the opposite effect on capital flight.
Furthermore, the rate of  return differential statistically significant positive effect on
capital flight also implies that capital flight may be expected to flow abroad as the
risk-adjusted rate of  return is higher elsewhere. This result is also in support of  the
conventional portfolio choice theory assumption that capital flight in SSA countries
is driven by higher and stable world interest rate relative the domestic interest rates.
Real Exchange Rate
The coefficient on the real exchange rate has the expected positive sign, which is
statistically significant. This result concurs with Ngeno (2000) and Ajayi (1992).
The result suggests that the overvaluation of  the exchange rate leads to capital
flight. When a nation’s currency is overvalued, there is an expectation that the
currency will depreciate in the future, and this induces the private investors or
savers to shift their portfolio compositions in favour of  foreign assets. So, as the
money supply increases while foreign exchange earnings decline, the exchange
rate become overvalued. People expect the exchange rate to be devalued and hence
attempt is made to send their capital out of  the country to avoid potential capital
loss.
Financial Development: The proxy measure for financial development in SSA
countries has a negative coefficient as expected. The coefficient is also statistically
significant. However, Collier et al. (2001), and Boyce and Ndikumana (2002) using
M2/GDP and M3/GDP respectively as a proxy for financial development found
the coefficient to be negative and insignificant. This contradiction may be due to the
fact that these other studies used cross country data set. The empirical finding in this
study suggests that financial development in SSA countries can reduce capital flight
if  accompanied by an expansion of  opportunities for domestic portfolio
diversification.
Budget Deficit: Consistent with other empirical studies (Ajayi (1992)), Boyce
and Ndikumana (2003) and Lawanson (2007), the budget deficit variable has a positive
sign, and statistically significant in all models at 5% level of  significance. The positive
sign suggests that a large government deficit may promote capital flight. This highlights
the motivation of  investors to move capital abroad to escape future taxation directly
and indirectly via monetisation of  deficits. The result implies that fiscal mismanagement
and the need for future fiscal adjustment be it through formal taxation or inflationary
financing clearly reflects the risks associated with domestic policy environment.
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6.1. Robustness Check to Different Specification
The only different result in our robustness check is the lagged capital flight, the
estimated coefficient on the lagged capital flight are positive and significant at mostly
1% level. This result is in conformity with the theoretical expectation and the result
equally indicates that there is a tendency for past capital flight to have a positive and
significant effect on current capital flight from SSA member countries. It also suggests
that capital flight has a tendency to persist over time. This may reflect a habit formation
effect, as capital flight corrodes the legitimacy of  capital controls, particularly if  the
capitalists include government authorities. At the same time, capital flight may
contribute to the deterioration of  the macroeconomic environment, and in turn
fuelling further capital flight. The results from all the techniques support the findings
from the studies of  Ndiaye (2009), Boyce and Ndikumana (2003, 2007), Mikkelsen
(1991), and Vos (1992).
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Determinants of  Capital Flight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Real capital flight(2010) 125 927.5 3, 088 -11, 114 27, 338
GDP Per Capita 125 957.9 1, 416 128.2 8, 522
Inflation(%GDP) 125 100.7 647.2 -5.111 7, 034
Polity2 125 -0.976 5.122 -9 9
Debt(%GDP) 124 4.768 4.493 0.294 27.36
Corruption(ICRG) 125 4.069 1.679 0 8.774
Budget Deficit 56 -0.918 5.999 -11.78 21.10
Interest Rate Differential 125 -1.725 28.23 -212.8 104.0
Bank Credit to Private Sector(dcpsb) 123 13.29 12.59 0.154 74.71
Real Exchange Rate 60 126.6 62.22 23.73 404.2
FDI Inflows 124 3.818 9.191 -1.706 6.733
Notes: Data on GDP per capita, Domestic Credit to the Private Sector by banks, Inflation, Interest
Rate Differentials, Foreign Direct Investment Inflow (FDI), Real and Effective and Exchange
Rate are all taken from the World Development Indicators Dataset of  the World Bank (2015).
For these variables, summary statistics are based on average data for the period 1986-2010.
Data on Real Capital Flight are taken from the Boyce and Ndikumana dataset at the Political
Economy Research Institute, University of  Massachusett, USA. The Polity2 variable is taken
the Polity IV Project.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The principal goal of  this paper has been to find out the role of  corruption as a
determinant of  capital flight over the past decades in SSA. Apart from the many
determinants of  capital flight known to the literature, no other study has attempted
to investigate the direct effect of  corruption on capital flight; specifically, the
paper uniquely focused first on the introduction of  corruption variable into the
capital flight model. To the best of  our knowledge, there are no other existing
studies that considered these two phenomena in the context of  economic growth
analysis. The formalization of  these relationships and the results we have presented
in this paper constitutes a substantial contribution to the literature on capital flight
and corruption. In other words, it is considered to be a clear contribution which
aims to fill the gap in the existing literature. For this reason, the paper employed a
sample of  panel observation for 25 countries over the period of  1986 to 2010.
The data for the study were taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI,
2015), Boyce and Ndikumana (2010) dataset on capital flight, Polity IV Project,
Political Risk Services (ICRG, 2014), and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2012).
The study also used different estimation techniques like pooled OLS, Random
Effects and GMM. The conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that:
corruption, our main variable of  interest as it relates to the determinants of  capital
flight is positive and statistically significant. This means that for countries within
our sample, corruption is a positive determinant of  capital flight. It equally means
that corruption encourages capital flight from the region. The findings of  this
paper have clear policy implications. In order to reduce capital flight within the
region, policy makers in SSA countries should focus on undertaking institutional
reforms to reduce corruption and by extension capital flight. Furthermore,
stabilizing their economic and political environment. In particular, they should
apply clear and accurate policies regarding their external debt and foreign direct
investment, as well as with respect to monetary policies, affecting interest rates.
Such clear and stable policies are likely to reduce uncertainty and their impact on
the real GDP growth and real value of  wealth as perceived by different agencies,
which will in turn help to reduce the level of  corruption in the economy and its
effect on capital flight.
Notes
1. See http://www.sustainabledevelopment2015.org/index.php/news/284-news-sdgs/1630-un-secretary-
general-releases-post-2015-synthesis-report for details on SDGs.
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2. Examples of  African Leaders in this regard are: President H. Boigny of  Ivory Coast,
President Mobutu of  Zaire, General Sani Abacha of  Nigeria https://www.laits.utexas.edu/
africa/ads/273.html
3. The “Panama Papers” scandal is a trove of  leaked documents, apparently the biggest data
leak in history (11 million documents) from the Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca,
with international specialism to launder money, create shell companies, hide cash from tax
authorities and dodge sanctions for those willing to engage the firm. Many past and current
African leaders’ names were found in these documents. http://time.com/4297388/panama-
papers-africa-investment/
4. Data are available online at www.peri.umass.edu/africa (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2011)
6. See http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-2004-2013/ for
details.
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